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I. Introduction 
 As a public policy major with an interest in education policy, I’ve closely followed issues 
in school reform within the last year. As I studied current and past school reform initiatives and 
efforts, I began to realize that teachers’ unions, both local and national, play a large role (if not 
the largest) in affecting all reforms and policies in education. Typically, teachers’ unions have 
strived to maintain the status quo in education, and thus the unions have opposed many reforms. 
As powerful political entities, the unions have utilized a number of strategies in blocking 
educational reforms, including directly influencing related legislation, boycotting certain 
business or organizations that support education reforms, and teacher strikes.  
 Yet, while the unions have traditionally opposed many reform programs, including 
charter schools, voucher programs, and merit pay programs, studies have also shown instances in 
which teachers’ unions have supported or at the very least accepted new reforms, such as the 
introduction of a new charter school or a  merit pay program. These instances should be of 
particular interest to policy makers, especially policy makers who are active in education policy 
and believe in the effectiveness of reform programs because the more policy makers understand 
why teachers’ unions support or oppose reforms, the better policy makers will be able to 
negotiate with teachers’ unions in order to successfully coordinate reforms in education.  
 In an effort to provide better information to public policy makers, my senior thesis seeks 
to answer the following question: what circumstances lead to the willingness of teachers’ unions 
to support reforms/new initiatives in education? Alternatively, the thesis also seeks to discover 
which circumstances lead teachers’ unions to oppose reform. The thesis approaches these 
questions by examining the actions of teachers’ unions in response to different changes in 
education policy or expected policy. Teacher union activity includes, but is not limited to: 
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lobbying, public statements, litigation, boycotts and protests. Through studying the actions of the 
country’s major teacher unions, this thesis seeks to discover what drives teachers’ unions to 
oppose or accept change and provide information to policy makers and other parties interested in 
the teachers’ unions’ relationship to reforms in education.   
 The thesis is divided into a number of sections. Part II examines some of the relevant 
literature on teachers’ unions and reform in education (specifically, merit pay, charter school, 
and school voucher reforms). The literature review presented in Part II is split up into two 
sections itself; Section A which examines the actual effectiveness of the aforementioned school 
reform programs on student achievement, and Section B, which examines literature showing the 
ways in which teachers’ unions impact school reform.  
 In Part III, primary sources, including direct statements and information from teacher 
union websites and newspaper articles, are analyzed to determine how teachers’ unions actually 
respond to school reform issues. 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 The vices and virtues of the American teachers’ unions have been passionately debated 
by both scholars and average citizens alike for the past several decades. Education reform is 
certainly an enduring policy issue that continues to be probed as researchers, especially as those 
that closely follow education reform in elementary and secondary schools, strive to discover how 
teacher unions affect student performance and either hinder or support new reform movements in 
schools.  
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 In the United States, scholars present two different types of arguments for educational 
reform. Some scholars argue that the current schooling system needs to be reformed so that 
teachers may become more accountable, by initiating merit pay programs for example. Through 
the usage of a merit pay program, teachers would have more of an incentive to perform, as part 
of their salary would be based on student achievement and results.  
 While some research has shown that merit pay programs have led to increased student 
achievement, other literature notes that studies are still inconclusive. The United States’ two 
largest teacher unions, the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation 
of Teachers (AFT) have traditionally opposed most merit pay programs and schemes and have 
lobbied against such programs, but other smaller teachers’ unions such as the Washington 
Teachers’ Union, are currently considering such programs.  
 Others argue that it would not be enough to reform the current system, and that we must 
look at alternative schooling systems. These scholars have pushed for school choice programs, 
including charter schools and school vouchers. The findings on whether or not charter schools 
and school vouchers improve student achievement are very mixed, as is the literature that shows 
whether the teachers’ unions have advocated for or hindered the progress of such programs. 
 While policy makers, politicians, educators and formal researchers alike have all 
provided a vast amount of commentary and data on the topic of the teachers’ unions’ influence 
on education reform, the great majority of the literature available is biased, being produced by a 
few libertarian think tanks or by the teachers’ unions themselves. This literature review seeks to 
surpass these one sided arguments and consider the more neutral research on the topic that is 
currently available.  
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 As previously mentioned, the following literature review will be divided into two 
sections; the first section will examine the evidence that I have compiled which has shown 
school reform programs to be either successful or unsuccessful in raising student achievement 
levels. This first section will strive to provide a steady base for the arguments which are to be 
discussed in the second section.  
 The second section of the literature review will explore how teachers’ unions have 
directly affected the progress of school reform programs and thus student achievement. In this 
second section, I will first seek to discover what scholars have been reporting on how teachers’ 
unions have negatively affected student performance and how the teachers’ unions have hindered 
reform to the existing system by preventing merit pay programs and additionally, how teachers’ 
unions have hindered the implementation of alternative school choice systems, such as charter 
schools and voucher programs. This section will also review literature that probes why teachers’ 
unions have often been hostile towards reform.  
  Following this assessment, the literature review will then evaluate the scholarly research 
which has found teachers’ unions to have had either a positive impact or a mixed impact on 
student performance and will also detail the literature which has found teacher unions to support 
or at least allow certain reform movements. This section will also strive to review any literature 
that demonstrates any other benefits that the teachers’ unions may produce.  
 I have chosen to examine the selected literature because I believe that it is first important 
to understand the actual effectiveness of school programs, because if programs are ineffective, 
the ineffectiveness in and of itself could provide the reasoning for why teachers’ unions oppose 
some reform programs. I have also chosen to examine the instances in which teachers’ unions 
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have opposed or supported reforms to look for clues as to why certain reforms are supported 
when others reforms are not.  
 Through the literature review, I will specifically be examining examples of school reform 
and examples of teacher union opposition and support of such programs appearing in academic 
literature beginning in 1983 and through the present day. I chose to begin my examination in 
1983, that same year that President Ronald Reagan’s Commission on Excellence in Education 
published A Nation at Risk: the Imperative for Educational Reform.1 A Nation at Risk 
highlighted the problems American schools were facing at the time and called for reform. 
Following the publication, school reform programs and studies on school reform programs really 
began to proliferate, and as such much of the data I found begins in the 1980s.  
 
A. The Effectiveness of School Reform Programs on Student Achievement 
 Merit pay programs, sometimes referred to as “performance pay” programs, have been 
experimented with in several schools and school districts throughout the United States and 
internationally, but the evidence as to whether these programs are effective in raising student 
achievement is still rather scarce. Although the current literature available on the topic is scant, 
the literature that is available has been fairly consistent in finding merit pay programs to have 
positive effects on student achievement.  
 In a 2007 article published in the Peabody Journal of Education, authors Podgursky and 
Springer examine the economic case for merit pay for K-12 teachers and find that the growing 
body of international and domestic research on merit pay programs indicates that when properly 
implemented, merit pay programs can positively affect student achievement (Podgursky and 
                                                 
1 Source: National Commission on Excellence in Education. (1983). “A Nation at Risk: the Imperative for Education 
Reform.”  
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Springer 2007). While Podgursky and Springer’s study clearly confirms that teachers alter their 
behaviors and teaching methods in order to respond to incentives, their research also indicates 
that when incentive programs are poorly designed, student achievement outcomes are more 
mixed in nature.  
 A positive association between the use of individual teacher incentives and student 
achievement in a study produced by Figlio and Kenny as well (Figlio and Kenny 2007). Figlio 
and Kenny used data from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS) on schools, 
students and their families (a survey which indicates a number of factors, including the 
performance of students) as well as their own survey conducted in 2000 regarding the use of 
teacher incentives to determine whether incentives like merit pay positively affected student 
achievement (1). Utilizing a number of regression models, the authors find that regardless of the 
level of incentive teachers were offered or the ways in which different incentives were 
cumulated, the incentive coefficients were positive and at least marginally significant, indicating 
that teacher incentives did impact student achievement levels (15). Specifically, the study found 
that having any high salary incentive (20+ percent of salary range), is associated with a 1.7 point 
increase in student test scores (15). Thus, the report overall finds that merit pay is positively 
linked to increases in student achievement however the authors also note that they were not able 
to discern whether the relationship was due to the financial incentives or to the fact that perhaps 
the schools that chose to implement the merit pay programs were already better schools (20). Of 
course, more research on this topic is needed before the benefits of merit pay programs can be 
fully accepted.  
 Additionally, some of the current literature shows mixed findings. In a 2002 study 
published by The Journal of Human Resources, authors Ebert, Hollenback and Stone present 
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empirical evidence from a case study of two similar high schools, one school using a merit pay 
system and one school using a traditional pay system, and conclude that the school utilizing the 
merit pay system enjoyed higher levels of student retention rates in classrooms, but lower 
average levels of student achievement (Ebert, Hollenback and Stone 2002). In this particular 
case, the school that utilized the merit system had designed the program to increase student 
retention rates. In addition to the normal base pay, teachers were compensated for the number of 
students that made it to their classes. The developers of the program in this case assumed that 
increased student retention rates would lead to higher levels of achievement. This merit pay 
program did, in fact, lead to higher student retention rates with more students completing 
courses; however, average achievement levels dropped. Based on this evidence, one might jump 
to conclusions and determine that merit pay programs are ineffective; however the drop in 
average student achievement levels may simply indicate that students who would normally drop 
out of a course instead remained in the course, and thus these students’ grades may have affected 
class averages (922). Although this study does not prove the link between merit pay and student 
achievement levels, it does demonstrate that merit pay can be effective in motivating teachers to 
produce certain outcomes. The sample size of this study, however, is much too small to arrive at 
any certain conclusions.  
 While merit pay programs seek to reform the current educational system by holding 
teachers more accountable for student performance, school choice programs such as charter 
schools and voucher programs seek to provide alternatives to our traditional schooling systems. 
Proponents of school choice programs argue that allowing parents to choose their child’s school 
increases competition amongst schools and increases parental involvement, leading to better 
private and public schools and increased student achievement.  
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 Charter schools are public and private schools that receive public funding and are 
attended by choice. Charter schools are often freed from many of the rules and regulations that 
bind other public schools in exchange for producing higher levels of academic achievement and 
increased accountability.2 A significant amount of research on the effects of charter schools on 
student achievement has been produced. However, here too the evidence as to whether or not 
charter schools significantly improve student achievement is mixed. Most of the current 
literature shows that while charter schools show some promise, they are not the magic bullet that 
many politicians have made them out to be, and that many charter schools are currently 
performing no better than the average public school.  
 Based on data from California, Arizona, and Michigan charter school studies, and already 
published studies on the effectiveness of charter schools in these states, Qiuyun Lin in “An 
Evaluation of Charter School Effectiveness” concludes that charter schools in these states have 
merely met expectations and have achieved student academic gains quite similar; but no better 
than other public schools (Lin 2001). Similarly, a 2007 study by Zimmer and Buddin found very 
little evidence that the increased autonomy of charter schools led to any improvement in student 
achievement at all. The authors, relying on data from a survey of charter schools and traditional 
public schools as well as test score data, used regression models to test the significance of a 
number of variables in affecting student achievement. Overall, the authors found that the 
autonomy provided to administrators and instructors by charter schools and the additional 
                                                 
2 Definition based on data from the National Education Association (NEA) and the Maryland Charter School 
Network. 
National Education Association, “Charter Schools.” http://www.nea.org/charter/index.html (accessed 12/11/2008).  
Maryland Charter School Network, “What is a Charter School?” http://www.mdcharternetwork.org/csi_what.html 
(accessed 12/11/2008).  
 
 
 9 
instruction time often provided to students in charter schools had no effect on student 
achievement levels (270).  
 In comparing Newark, New Jersey’s traditional public schools and charter schools, Barr, 
Sadovnik and Visconti found that while some charter schools were able to achieve above average 
results, other charter schools performed worse than predicted (Barr, Sadovnik and Visconti 
2006). Thus, just as some traditional district schools perform very well and some perform badly, 
charter schools also mirrored this pattern and the authors found no evidence that charter schools 
were more successful in raising student achievement overall. In fact, through a regression 
analysis utilizing standardized test scores as variables, the authors were actually able to 
determine that charter school performance in Newark is a bit lower than that of traditional public 
schools on average (308).  
 While voucher programs widely vary, most voucher programs issue some sort of 
certificate or credit to the parents of school children which allow parents to choose whichever 
private or public school they would like their child to attend. Through my research I was able to 
find a great deal of literature which explored long standing voucher programs in other countries, 
namely Chile, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, but I was unable to find much literature on the 
progress and effectiveness of voucher programs in the United States. While the research 
available on voucher programs in the United States draws rather mixed conclusions, some 
researchers have found  American voucher programs to be positively affecting student 
achievement, if only marginally.  
 A 1998 article published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics analyzed a voucher 
parental choice program in Milwaukee and found that students who participated in the voucher 
program and attended nonsectarian private schools had faster math score gains than their 
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counterparts who did not receive such vouchers, while the reading score gains between the two 
groups were quite similar (Rouse 1998). In the case of this 1990 voucher program implemented 
in Milwaukee, only low income children were eligible to receive the vouchers, and the vouchers 
only allowed parents to choose to send their students to certain private schools rather than any 
available school. Although this study completed by Rouse is quite thorough, and indicates the 
potential for parental choice voucher programs to succeed in raising some student achievement 
levels, the sample studied is quite small and the group of students benefiting from voucher 
programs quite narrow, and thus it is difficult to gather any conclusions as to the effectiveness of 
voucher programs from this single study.  
 Alternatively, a 2002 study published in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 
noted that it was only African American students who were positively affected by school 
voucher programs (Howell 2002). The authors of “School Vouchers and Academic Performance: 
Results from Three Randomized Field Trials,” studied the effects of school vouchers on student 
test scores in three cities (New York City, Dayton, Ohio and Washington, D.C.) and found that 
after two years African Americans who had switched from public to private schools because of 
voucher programs gained an average of 6.3 National Percentile Ranking points on the Iowa Test 
of Basic Skills (191). The authors could not, however find any evidence that other ethnic groups 
were affected by school vouchers in any way. This study certainly shows that while voucher 
programs may be good for some (notably low income African Americans), voucher programs do 
not necessarily benefit all.  
 A very comprehensive look at most of the research conducted and empirical data 
available on the effects of school voucher programs thus far is offered by Patrick Wolf in 
“School Voucher Programs: What the Research Says about Parental School Choice” (Wolf 
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2008). Wolf also finds a growing body of research which shows that voucher programs boost the 
achievement of at least some of the students who are able to obtain school vouchers (435). Wolf 
studied the ten gold standard random-assignment studies on school voucher programs which 
have been completed to date (some of which have all ready been mentioned, including the Rouse 
and Howell articles) and constructed a table of all of the research available (438). Wolf’s table 
shows that voucher programs were found to have led to significant academic gains for students 
in reading and math in eight of the studies. Out of these eight studies which demonstrated that 
voucher programs have affected the academic gains of students, three of the studies show 
significant academic gains only for African American students. Wolf concludes that low income 
students have been able to benefit from targeted voucher programs and notes that these programs 
should continue. Wolf also warns, however, that voucher programs should not yet be 
implemented at the state or national level, as we know very little as to how a large group of 
diverse parents and students would respond to school voucher programs (446).  
 While the research certainly shows a lot of variation in the effectiveness of school choice 
programs, many of the studies do show that at least some students accrue benefits from choice 
programs. One might argue that if any particular group of students is able to improve 
academically due to a reform program, that the reform program should surely be researched 
further. Schools, children and policymakers could all benefit from additional research on the 
effectiveness of these programs.  
 
B. The Impact of Teachers’ Unions’ on School Reform  
 There are certainly no doubts among scholars as to the political strength and prowess of 
America’s teachers’ unions. The United States’ two national teacher unions, the National 
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Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) boast 
memberships of 3,167,612 and 832,058 respectively3 and collectively these two organizations 
spent over 47.5 million dollars on political activities and lobbying in 2007.4 In addition to these 
national teachers’ unions, I found in my research a number of very powerful teachers’ unions at 
the state level, including but not limited to the United Federation of Teachers, which represents 
New York City’s Public School teachers, the Newark Teachers’ Union, and the California 
Teachers’ Association. I also encountered in my research chapters of teachers’ unions and 
independent teachers’ unions that work on a local level. Together, the teachers’ unions of the 
United States are regarded as the most powerful political constituencies within American 
education, and thus the teachers’ unions have been paramount in shaping school reform 
movements in various ways. While the teachers’ unions have largely been recognized as barriers 
to reform movements and much of the literature demonstrates how the teachers’ unions have 
been especially hostile towards school choice movements, I also uncovered a small amount of 
literature that reveals the ways in which teachers’ unions have been active players in some 
reform movements.  
 While some scholars consider teacher unions to be bad for education because of union 
resistance to popular school reform ideas and programs, one might argue that the teachers’ 
unions could also be a positive force in education for the very same reason. As demonstrated by 
the previous section of the literature review, we still know very little about the overall effects of 
many school reform programs, and if the programs are ineffective, then teachers’ unions may be 
good for education because of their ability to block bad reforms.  
                                                 
3 Data on membership obtained from NEA and AFT union websites and from the Teachers Unions’ Facts website 
American Federation of Teachers, “Main Page.” 2008. http://www.aft.org/ (accessed 12/12/2008).  
National Education Association, “Main Page.” 2008. http://www.nea.org/index.html (accessed 12/12/2008).  
Teachers Union Facts, “Union Profiles.” 2008. http://teachersunionexposed.com/unions.cfm (accessed 12/12/2008).  
4 Ibid 
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 Alternatively, if teachers’ unions are supporting some reform movements, we might 
consider the unions to be a positive force if we believe that the data has shown that reform 
programs are able to lift student achievement levels, or a negative force if the programs are 
ineffective.  
  
 The following section of the literature review will focus on how teachers’ unions have 
hindered or helped the progress of school reform programs. Additionally, I will also explore in 
this section why teachers’ unions have generally opposed school reform efforts. The first three 
pieces of literature in this section examine the disincentives that the unions would be faced with 
if they were to support reforms, and accordingly provides rationale as to why the unions often 
block reforms. I then will turn my focus to examine the literature which demonstrates the actual 
actions unions have taken to block or weaken school reform efforts. Lastly, I will examine 
literature that reveals occasions when the teachers’ unions have supported or been involved in 
school reform efforts.  
 
 In an excerpt from Collective Bargaining in Education: Negotiating Change in Today's 
Schools, Moe offers a review of how teachers’ unions are driven by their own self interests 
rather than the best interests of children, and how this trend often leads to bad policymaking in 
education which may adversely affect students (Moe 2006). Moe notes that the idea of 
accountability is new to education, and that the teachers’ unions have fought against additional 
teacher accountability measures because they threatens teachers’ autonomy in the schools as well 
as teachers’ job security (246). Merit pay is in fact a measure of accountability, as typically with 
merit pay schemes teachers are paid a base salary as well as bonuses based on student 
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performance. For so many years, teachers were paid a steady salary regardless of how productive 
or unproductive they had been, so it is only rational that teachers’ unions would oppose an 
accountability movement which now threatens teachers’ livelihoods.  
 While, on one hand, the unions oppose and lobby against accountability movements, on 
the other hand unions prefer performance based programs that reward good teachers over actions 
that punish teachers such as pay cuts, teacher testing, and reductions in funding. So while Moe 
demonstrates why unions oppose reforms in accountability and how unions are working as 
barriers to change through political lobbying, this excerpt also confirms that there may still be 
hope for merit pay programs. As teachers’ unions are forced to accept change, they will be more 
willing to accept merit pay reform over other types of reforms in accountability.  
 Ultimately, Moe defines the main goal of teachers’ unions as blocking and weakening 
reforms in order to maintain the status quo (252). The unions use their political skills to prevent 
reform that could lead to a better education for America’s children.   
 McDonnell similarly identifies the teachers’ unions’ struggle to maintain the status quo 
(McDonnell 1998). McDonnell observes that teachers’ unions would be best off in the long run if 
the unions were to actually become active in the shaping of new reform movements; however the 
internal risk to union organizations that choose to participate in reform movements would be 
very high (16).  In other words, if the president of a teachers’ union sought to involve the union 
in actual efforts to reform the school system, he or she could expect a lot of opposition from 
union members. Thus, unions typically defend the status quo because the internal risk of 
defending the status quo is very low and because the unions must keep their members satisfied in 
order to maintain membership and power.  
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 A study published by the Mackinac Center for Public Policy also confirms powerful 
financial incentives often place pressure on unions to maintain the status quo and block school 
choice reforms (Brouillette & Williams 1999). In this study, authors Brouillette and Williams 
specifically studied the unionization rates at public schools, private schools and charter schools 
in Michigan. The authors find that unions have a strong incentive to oppose charter school 
reform movements because the unionization rate at charter schools is extraordinarily low at 
around 4 percent, while the unionization rate at public schools in Michigan is at 100 percent. The 
study notes that the proliferation of charter schools would most certainly lead to more parents 
placing their children in charter schools, and accordingly as the charter schools found a need for 
more teachers, more teachers from the unionized government schools would choose to teach at 
non-unionized charter schools (12). If a large movement of students and teachers to charter 
schools were to happen, unions would lose membership and more importantly, the mandatory 
dues which are collected from all union members. This would inevitably lead to a loss of power, 
and because the unions seek to hold as much power as possible, the unions have typically 
opposed charter school reform (13). 
 While this study certainly offers interesting points as to how school choice may threaten 
the financial and political power of teachers’ unions (14), the data and research are confined only 
to Michigan teachers’ unions and schools and while one could reasonably expect the same results 
on a national basis, additional studies should be done to confirm these findings.  
 
  60 percent of the total amount raised designated to help fight school choice proposals in 
Michigan and California as well as other school choice ballot issues (34). Obviously, the 
teachers’ unions put a great deal of money and energy into fighting school choice programs.  
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 The teachers’ unions have also acted as barriers to educational reform through the 
strategic use of boycotts. For example, school vouchers have become especially popular amongst 
the American public and American entrepreneurs and private businesses. Some businesses have 
even been active in helping to shape reform movements or have donated funds in order to create 
voucher or scholarship programs that have enabled low income students to attend private 
schools.5  
 The Pepsi-Cola company is one such organization that in 1996 sought to provide private 
scholarships to low-income Jersey City families (Liberman 1997 160). Once the Jersey City 
Education Association, a state affiliate branch of the NEA learned of Pepsi-Cola’s plans to 
initiate the scholarship program, the union threatened to boycott all Pepsi-Cola products and also 
damaged Pepsi-Cola vending machines in Jersey City schools and throughout the city. The union 
was intimidating enough that the Pepsi-Cola company ultimately decided to withdraw their 
scholarships (161).  
 While I found it difficult to find several examples of teacher union boycotts based on 
reform programs in academic and professional journals and articles, I was able to find several 
primary sources which noted teacher union boycotts or protests based on reform programs. These 
primary sources are further explored in the third section of this research paper. I also have 
collected several primary documents which note the lobbying activities of the teachers’ unions as 
well as the political spending patterns of the unions (money that has been spent on supporting 
certain candidates and policies, as well as money spent on ad campaigns either supporting or 
opposing certain policies) which are also discussed in Section III. While it is unfortunate that I 
was unable to find very many academic publications examining the political actions of the 
                                                 
5 Throughout my research, several newspaper articles noted businesses that have created voucher programs. These 
articles are noted in the “Primary Research” section of the Bibliography.  
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teachers’ unions, this also signifies that much more research needs to be done and the research 
produced in this thesis could prove to be very useful.  
 
 If we do believe that the literature has shown that school reform programs have been 
effective in helping at least some of America’s students, then the aforementioned articles and 
studies have demonstrated how teachers’ unions can negatively impact education by acting as 
barriers to reform. Sometimes, however, unions have been instrumental in initiating or shaping 
reforms.  
 The push for reforms in education really exploded onto the scene in 1983 when a key 
document, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for School Reform was published by the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education (Berube 1988 128). The report had basically outlined 
the deteriorating quality of American schools and suggested that reform movements were 
necessary. Following the publicity of the document, the Reagan administration became a major 
supporter of instituting merit pay programs in order to improve academic achievement in public 
schools. While the two national teachers’ unions greatly opposed merit pay and other reform 
movements, Albert Shanker, the President of the AFT in the 1980s, was able to use his sharp 
political skills to create some reforms in education that calmed union members and appeased the 
public at the same time.  Shanker called for an “era of enlightened professionalism” in which 
teachers’ unions would go beyond the focus on collective bargaining and would focus on 
improving teacher professionalism and “the status of teachers economically, socially and 
politically” (145).  He suggested that professional teacher boards be initiated and that these 
boards would develop standards, handle parent complaints, and address a number of other 
problems with the educational system (143). Additionally, the AFT under the leadership of 
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Shanker also weakly endorsed the need for national teacher certification (143).  Shanker realized 
that if he did not become involved in the reform movement to a certain extent, he and the 
teachers’ unions would be destroyed by the reform movement. Thus, Shanker pushed for 
marginally beneficial reforms that allowed teachers to maintain their autonomy while also 
appeasing the public.   
 Alternatively, I also discovered quite a few articles that show that teachers’ unions have 
sometimes supported or become involved in some of the reform movements discussed earlier, 
such as charter school movements. In fact, although Albert Shanker opposed merit pay and 
voucher programs, Shanker actually popularized the idea of charter schools in the 1980’s (Malin 
and Kerchner 2007).  Shanker imagined charter schools as a sort of community of professionals 
in which teachers would be able to thrive and enjoy a significant amount of autonomy. Shanker 
also believed that the teachers’ unions would be involved in the creation and operation of charter 
schools. While originally the charter school movement was supported by Shanker and the AFT, 
today that is no longer the case as charter schools currently are focused on providing a private-
school like education to children, typically do not include unionized teachers, and thus are not 
the charter schools that Shanker had imagined.  
 While charter schools today are not officially supported by the national teacher unions, 
research shows that unions sometimes do play a positive role in the creation and operation of 
charter schools. In “Charter School Policy, Implementation and Diffusion across the United 
States,” Renzulli and Roscigno utilize a number of methods, including a random-effects negative 
binomial regression and find that while teachers’ unions are often very effective in deterring 
legislation in favor of charter schools, once legislative reform in favor of charter schools has 
passed the unions become actively involved in the creation of charter schools (360). The authors 
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suggest that this may be the case because once the unions have failed at deterring legislation, the 
unions realize that the creation of charter schools will be inevitable and would rather have a say 
in how schools will be operated rather than have no input or impact at all.  
 
 The evidence explored  in this literature review shows that teachers’ unions have 
typically prevented reforms in education through political lobbying, and the instances in which 
unions have supported or initiated reform or either rare or rarely recorded in the academic 
literature. While educational reform is a hot topic that is often discussed in public forums, it 
seems that there has not been enough impartial research conducted on the topic. Certainly, there 
has been much research conducted by the teachers’ unions themselves and by libertarian think 
tanks, but I was unable to find many strictly neutral sources available on the effectiveness of 
reform programs and on the impact that teachers’ unions have had on reform movements and 
efforts. Issues in educational reform will certainly remain in the spotlight for years to come, 
although it is not clear as to whether the attention will lead to more rational, well executed 
research.  
 While scholars have been quick to test and demonstrate the ways in which the country’s 
teachers’ unions have blocked reforms that could potentially lead to increases in academic 
achievement for students, I was unable to find any suggestions in scholarly journals as to how 
policy makers might seek to push reforms through in spite of strong teacher union opposition. 
Furthermore, I was unable to find any research that offered suggestions for better integrating the 
teachers’ unions into the reform movements, or suggestions as to how we might implement 
reforms in education that would benefit students without necessarily threatening the teaching 
profession. Clearly, there is still much research that needs to be done as policymakers today must 
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make difficult decisions involving merit pay programs and school choice reform programs in 
America’s schools and must be able to access research on this important matter. Additional 
research would aid policymakers and politicians in choosing reform programs for their schools 
and in navigating the tough political waters in which the teachers’ unions lurk, ready to strike. 
 
III. Actual Teacher Union Responses to and Interactions with Issues in Education Reform 
 
 The scholarly literature available on the role of teachers’ unions in influencing 
educational reform, while sparse, certainly provides some insight as to why and how the 
teachers’ unions have traditionally opposed educational reform in the form of merit pay, charter 
schools, and vouchers. Still, when attempting to understand a complicated and long-standing 
conflict, it seems best to directly confront the main source of the conflict itself; for the purpose of 
this thesis, that source is the teachers’ unions themselves.  
 The following section begins by noting the United States’ two primary teacher unions’ 
official stances and statements regarding merit pay, charter schools and school vouchers. These 
statements which can be directly attributed to the teacher unions are listed on the unions’ 
respective official websites. The section will then examine the various actions of teacher unions 
in response to educational reform issues and initiatives as reported by newspapers, magazines 
and other forms of media.  
 
 
A. Teacher Unions’ Official Statements 
 The National Education Association’s statements regarding merit pay, charter schools 
and school vouchers, as listed on their official website located at www.nea.org, are as follows:  
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NEA’s stance on merit pay (referred to by the NEA as “performance pay”):  
 “NEA opposes federal requirements for a pay system that mandates teacher pay based on 
 student performance or student test scores. However, state and local NEA affiliates are 
 open to compensation innovations that enhance preparation and practice that drive 
 student performance, if they meet the following criteria: 
• In collective bargaining states, such programs must be agreed to through collective 
bargaining. 
• In states where bargaining does not now exist, implementation of such programs must be 
agreed to by a 75 percent support vote of those affected or through the organization 
representing the majority of teachers.”6 
NEA’s stance on charter schools:  
 “State laws and regulations governing charter schools vary widely. NEA's state affiliates 
 have positions on charter schools that are appropriate to the situation in their 
 states. NEA's policy statement sets forth broad parameters and minimum criteria by 
 which to evaluate state charter laws. For example: 
• A charter should be granted only if the proposed school intends to offer an educational 
experience that is qualitatively different from what is available in traditional public 
schools.  
                                                 
6 Quoted directly from: National Education Association, “Fact Sheet on NEA’s views regarding mandated 
performance pay for educators.” http://www.nea.org/home/15069.htm 
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• Local school boards should have the authority to grant or deny charter applications; the 
process should be open to the public, and applicants should have the right to appeal to a 
state agency decisions to deny or revoke a charter.  
• Charter school funding should not disproportionately divert resources from traditional 
public schools.  
• Charter schools should be monitored on a continuing basis and should be subject to 
modification or closure if children or the public interest is at risk.  
• Private schools should not be allowed to convert to public charter schools, and private 
for-profit entities should not be eligible to receive a charter.  
• Charter schools should be subject to the same public sector labor relations statutes as 
traditional public schools, and charter school employees should have the same collective 
bargaining rights as their counterparts in traditional public schools.”7 
NEA’s stance on school vouchers:  
 “NEA opposes school vouchers because they divert essential resources from public 
 schools to private and religious schools, while offering no real "choice" for the 
 overwhelming majority of students.”8 
 Based on these statements, it is clear that while the NEA is absolutely against some types 
of reforms, such as school vouchers, in other areas of reform, such as charter schools, the union 
decides whether it will support or oppose certain reforms based on the specific circumstances of 
the reform in question. For example, the NEA or local NEA chapters might support the 
                                                 
7 Quoted directly from: National Education Association “Charter Schools.” http://www.nea.org/home/16332.htm 
8 Quoted directly from: National Education Association “Vouchers.” http://www.nea.org/home/16378.htm 
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formation of a new charter school only if the opening of the new charter school falls under the 
strict parameters and conditions outlined by the NEA.  
 
The American Federation of Teacher’s statements regarding merit pay, charter schools and 
school vouchers, as listed on their official website located at www.aft.org are as follows:  
 
AFT’s stance on merit pay (referred to by the AFT as “differentiated pay” or “performance pay”: 
 “The American Federation of Teachers believes the decision to adopt a compensation 
 system based on differentiated pay should be made by the local union leaders and district 
 officials who know best what will work in their schools. Systems must be locally 
 negotiated, voluntary, schoolwide, and must promote a collaborative work environment. 
 Well-designed compensation systems based on differentiated pay for teachers must 
 include the following elements: 
• Labor-management collaboration 
• Adequate base compensation for all teachers 
• Credible, agreed-upon standards of practice 
• Support for professional development 
• Incentives that are available to all teachers 
• Easily understood standards for rewards 
• Sufficient and stable funding 
• Necessary support systems, such as data and accounting systems 
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 In addition, AFT locals have developed school-wide differentiated pay based on a 
 combination of academic indicators, including standardized test scores, students' 
 classroom work, dropout rates and disciplinary incidents. Teachers reject being evaluated 
 on a single test score. Additional compensation should also be given to teachers earning 
 National Board for Professional Teaching Standards certification; for those working in 
 challenging schools that have teacher shortages; and for teachers who mentor, provide 
 peer support and participate in other professional activities.”9 
AFT’s stance on charter schools:  
 “The American Federation of Teachers strongly supports charter schools that embody the 
 core values of public education and a democratic society: equal access for all students; 
 high academic standards; accountability to parents and the public; a curriculum that 
 promotes good citizenship; a commitment to helping all public schools improve; and a 
 commitment to the employees' right to freely choose union representation.”10 
AFT’s stance on school vouchers: 
 “The AFT supports parents' right to send their children to private or religious schools but 
 opposes the use of public funds to do so. The main reason for this opposition is because 
 public funding of private or religious education transfers precious tax dollars from public 
 schools, which are free and open to all children, accountable to parents and taxpayers 
 alike, and essential to our democracy, to private and religious schools that charge for their 
                                                 
9 Quoted directly from: American Federation of Teachers “Differentiated Pay.” http://www.aft.org/topics/teacher-
quality/compensation/performance-pay.htm 
10 Quoted directly from: American Federation of Teachers “Charter Schools.” 
http://www.aft.org/topics/charters/index.htm 
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 services, select their students on the basis of religious or academic or family or personal 
 characteristics, and are accountable only to their boards and clients. 
 In recent years, advocates of public funding of private and religious schools have argued 
 that "school choice" and the ensuing "competition" between public and private schools 
 will improve public schools and student achievement. The evidence does not support this 
 argument.  In contrast, the research clearly indicates that reducing class size or adopting 
 scientifically based reading programs, for example, improves student achievement.”11 
B. Teacher Union Actions in Response to Educational Reform Issues and Initiatives 
It is imperative to observe the actual responses of teacher unions to educational reform issues 
and initiatives to verify that the actions do in fact correspond with the teacher unions’ official 
stances on reform issues. Observing and following teacher union actions also enables researchers 
and policymakers to better understand the full variety of responses and reactions that teacher 
unions can be expected to exhibit.  
While an exhaustive study of the responses of teachers unions cannot be performed within 
the confines of this thesis, three cases of teacher union responses to reform issues and initiatives 
in particular are examined to demonstrate the variety of responses that unions may exhibit.  
 
Case #1: Teacher Union Participation in the Creation of a Merit Pay System 
In Denver, Colorado the Denver Classroom Teachers Association, a local affiliate of the 
National Education Association (NEA), has created and tested its own merit pay system for 
                                                 
11 Quoted directly from: American Federation of Teachers “Vouchers.” 
http://www.aft.org/topics/vouchers/index.htm 
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Denver’s city teachers.12While the NEA and AFT have expressed openness to merit pay 
programs created by school administration so long as the programs adhere to certain guidelines 
that have been established by the unions, this instance is unique in that the merit pay program 
was actually initiated by the teachers’ union and not the administration.  
Brad Jupp, the leader of the Denver Classroom Teachers Union noted that the union 
recognized that reform was inevitable, and accordingly decided that the union should play a 
major role in designing and initiating reform.  
The teachers’ union in Denver created a merit system that included bonuses for teachers 
choosing to earn higher degrees in the subjects the teachers taught, as well as for teachers 
reaching individual performance goals that each teacher set with their school principals. Bonuses 
were also established for teachers whose students improved on standardized tests, for teachers 
working in schools labeled as “distinguished” by district administrators, for teachers who 
received good evaluations from administrators, and for teachers who accepted school 
assignments identified by the district as high priority, i.e., assignments teaching hard-to-fill 
subject areas or students needing special attention and support.  
The union-designed merit pay plan was introduced in 16 of Denver’s 104 schools for a two 
year experimental period (which was later extended to four years) beginning in 1999. The merit 
pay experiment was declared a success by the Denver Classroom Teachers Union in 2004, and 
accordingly the union decided to make the pay system a permanent fixture in Denver schools. 
Before the pay system was initiated in all schools, however, the union was faced with the 
challenge of gaining the support of the majority of Denver teachers for the pay system. Even 
though the union had developed the merit pay system itself, union members were still hesitant 
                                                 
12 Based upon New York Times article on initiative: 
McGray, Douglas. (2005). “Working with the Enemy” New York Times. Retrieved May 5th, 2009 from The New 
York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/16/education/edlife/EDUNIO.html?_r=2 
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about accepting the pay reform. Only four months before the new merit pay system was 
scheduled to be voted upon, a poll showed that only 19 percent of teachers would support the 
change, and that more than half of teachers were strongly opposed to the new pay system. Upon 
realizing how strongly union members were opposed to the proposed pay system, union 
leadership began to campaign for the reform by printing and providing literature on the proposed 
system to teachers and by sending volunteers to each classroom to discuss the new system with 
teachers. The union’s campaigning was effective; four months later on the morning of the vote, 
59 percent of teachers voted to accept the new pay system.  
Though traditionally policy makers and school administrators have considered teachers’ 
unions to be barriers to reform,13 this case demonstrates that unions can and sometimes do act as 
catalysts for reforms. The Denver Classroom Teachers Union not only devised its own merit pay 
scheme, but also campaigned amongst its own members in order to gain enough support for the 
program. This particular occurrence of a teachers’ union actually engaging in a reform effort 
mirrors the observations made by McDonnell in her 1998 study, Teacher Unions and 
Educational Reform. McDonnell theorized that in the long run, unions would be better off if 
unions were to participate in the actual shaping of reforms, however McDonnell also noted that 
the internal risk to unions choosing to participate in reform efforts would be high, hence the 
reason why unions have traditionally supported the status quo. The Denver Classroom Teachers 
Union similarly speculated that it would be better to be involved in reforming education, 
specifically pay in education, since the union believed that reform would occur sooner or later in 
any case. Furthermore, as McDonnell had suggested, the Denver teachers union did experience 
                                                 
13Education Secretary Rod Paige of the Bush administration branded the NEA as a “terrorist organization,” and also 
referred to the union as a “group of obstructionists”:  
Pear, Robert. (2004). “Education Chief Calls Union ‘Terrorist,’ Then Recants.” Retrieved May 5 th, 2009 from The  
New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/us/education-chief-calls-union-terrorist-then-recants.html 
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internal opposition when attempting to initiate reform. In this particular case, the risk paid off 
because the reform was successfully established, however, under other circumstances it is quite 
possible that the union members would have killed such a reform effort and perhaps even ousted 
the union leaders. 
The case serves as an example of unions directly interacting with reform initiatives and 
playing a role in reform efforts. It is likely though that this case is the exception to the rule, as 
there are far more cases in which unions have acted in opposition to reform issues. Case #2 and 
Case #3 shown below, demonstrate the ways in which unions often oppose and block reforms.  
 
Case #2: Teacher Union Political and Legislative Action against School Vouchers 
The Texas Federation of Teachers (Texas AFT), the Texas State affiliate of the American 
Federation of Teachers, has established a clear legislative and political agenda for 2009 which 
includes lobbying against school vouchers. The Texas AFT legislative agenda for the year notes 
that the union believes legislators should “block vouchers and equivalent drains on public school 
funding.”14 The Texas AFT website also displays several requests that its members call, email, 
and write letters to state senators and other representatives regarding a recent bill in the Texas 
legislature which would provide some private schools with public funding. Although the bill (HB 
2237), developed by Texas State Commissioner of Education Robert Scott does not technically 
support any student voucher programs, the Texas AFT has labeled the bill as a “back-door 
attempt at private vouchers” because the bill would provide public monies directly to private 
schools. 15 In actuality, the bill intends to provide additional funding to both public and private 
                                                 
14 Information attributed to Texas AFT 2009 Legislative Agenda: 
http://tx.aft.org/index.cfm?action=article&articleid=24c911c7-60cd-4fc5-bff2-b94ea4731f80 
15 Quoted by Texas AFT’s Action Alert: “Stop TEA’s Back-Door Private-School Vouchers.” 
http://www.unionvoice.org/campaign/backdoorvouchers 
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schools with the purpose of seeking to decrease school dropout rates in Texas and increase 
student enrollment in both public and private schools.16  
It is very apparent through the language used by the Texas AFT that the union is fully aware 
of its own political strength and the utility of union members as political constituents able to 
influence policymakers and legislative representatives with their votes. The following excerpt, 
borrowed from a message written by the union leaders and made available to union members to 
send to their respective political representatives, also demonstrates the union’s knowledge of the 
delicate political situation in which Commissioner of Education Robert Scott currently stands:  
The commissioner, as an interim gubernatorial appointee, still must face a Senate 
confirmation hearing and vote next session in order to remain in office. I urge you to convey 
to him that this attempt to usurp legislative authority and steer taxpayer funds to private 
schools, if not renounced, should and would prevent his confirmation.17 
The message insinuates that the union plans to use its political power to influence 
Commissioner Robert Scott and to perhaps lead the commissioner to back down from his 
original plans to institute a bill targeting public funding towards private schools. Although the 
union members may not be able to directly influence Robert Scott’s position as Commissioner of 
Education (as noted, the commissioner will face a Senate confirmation hearing and vote, not a 
public vote), Texas AFT members could contact their own senators regarding the issue, urging 
the representatives to vote against keeping Commissioner Robert Scott in office. While it is 
unknown how effective the union’s efforts will be in altering the Commissioner’s plans to 
                                                 
16 Senate Research Center (2007).C.B.H.B. 2237 Bill Analysis. 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/analysis/html/HB02237S.htm 
17 Excerpt from Texas AFT’s Action Alert: “Stop TEA’s Back-Door Private-School Vouchers.” 
http://www.unionvoice.org/campaign/backdoorvouchers 
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initiate the bill, it can be assumed that Texas legislators, in an effort to appease their 
constituency, will at the very least consider the union’s argument against the bill.  
Thus, this case demonstrates how teachers’ unions may use political prowess to push union 
agendas in the political arena and to act as barriers to reform in education. This example 
reaffirms assertions established by Moe in Collective Bargaining in Education: Negotiating 
Change in Today's Schools. Moe argued that teachers’ unions are driven by their own self 
interests rather than the interests of students, and teachers’ unions will block and weaken reform 
efforts in order to maintain the status quo. The Texas AFT ultimately is trying to block a reform 
in order to maintain the status quo, and additionally, it seems that the union is not considering 
how the bill might actually affect Texas pupils, who may very well benefit from a program that 
seeks to keep students enrolled in both public and private schools (namely charter schools). 
Instead, the union is focused on its own needs, and is fully cognizant of the fact that increased 
public funding being delivered to private schools and charter schools would result in more 
funding going to schools with non-unionized teachers, whereas the union would prefer to keep 
all funding in fully unionized schools.  
 
Case #3: Teacher Union Legal Action against Charter School Openings 
In March of 2009 the United Federation of Teachers, the New York City affiliate of the 
American Federation of Teachers, filed a lawsuit in New York State Supreme Court against New 
York City’s Department of Education on the grounds that the department had violated state law 
by deciding to replace three traditional public schools with charter schools without properly 
consulting the local neighborhood school boards.18 The Department of Education decided to 
                                                 
18 Based upon New York Times article: 
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close the three schools in question – Public School 194, Public School 241 and Public School 
150 – towards the end of 2008 due to poor academic performance in each school and a lack of 
popularity amongst local residents. Charter schools planned to replace the traditional schools and 
occupy the building space where the traditional schools had once operated, however those plans 
have been stalled since the United Federation of Teachers filed the lawsuit arguing that the city 
was required to gain approval from the local school boards overseeing the public schools before 
closing and replacing the schools.  
Furthermore, the Department of Education has also been accused of eliminating so-called 
“attendance zones” since the removal of the schools would leave neighborhoods with no 
traditional public schools for children to attend. If the change were to be completed, however, 
neighborhood children would receive priority in admission to the new charter schools, and 
children would also have the option of attending other traditional public schools within the city.  
When one considers the situation that the Department of Education found itself in, it is really 
unsurprising that the department failed to consult with the local school boards. Although failing 
to properly consult with local school boards may have just been a bureaucratic error on the part 
of the Department of Education, it is also likely that the department may have realized that local 
school boards would have been apt to disapprove of the closure of the schools. Although the 
schools were performing poorly, closure of the traditional schools would certainly result in the 
loss of jobs for unionized teachers. Even if the unionized teachers could be transferred to other 
public schools, it would certainly inconvenience the teachers and staff.  
The United Federation of Teachers has claimed to be concerned with the welfare of the 
students due to the closure of the schools; however it is difficult to determine whether the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hernandez, Jaiver. (2009). “Suit Challenges City Plan to Replace Three Schools.” New York Times. Retrieved 
May7th, 2009 from New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/education/25charter.html?_r=1&hpw 
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concern may really just be a façade. It seems more likely that once again, as established by Moe, 
the union is more concerned about the future of the unionized teachers working at the failing 
schools than the welfare of the children. If the failing schools were to be kept open, it is probable 
that the pupils would suffer from an inadequate education, whereas the children could potentially 
have access to a better education if the charter schools were allowed to open and the new charter 
schools were successful. Furthermore, the lawsuit filed by the school district promises to delay 
any plans the Department of Education may have had to replace the failing public schools, 
meaning that the students will be forced to remain in poorly performing schools until the lawsuit 
has been resolved. If the United Federation of Teachers was truly concerned about the welfare of 
students, the union may have tried to resolve issues with the Department of Education itself and 
arrive at a solution to providing pupils with an improved education instead of filing the lawsuit 
which will keep the children in the failing schools for an indefinite amount of time until the issue 
can be resolved.  
While it cannot yet be determined whether or not the lawsuit against the New York City 
Department of Education is actually in the best interest of the children, it is clear that suing the 
department was an entirely logic move from a teachers’ union standpoint. As established by 
Brouillette and Williams, unions have a strong incentive to oppose the opening of charter schools 
because the unionization rate at charter schools is exceptionally low at charter schools. The 
closure of three traditional public schools with the simultaneous opening of three charter schools 
would lead to a loss of power for unions as enrollment in charter schools would increase and 
more teachers might choose to teach and the non-unionized charter schools.  
 
 
 33 
Conclusion 
 
The three cases examined, as well as the literature reviewed, demonstrate the wide variety of 
union responses to reform efforts and initiatives, as well as the methods used by teachers’ unions 
in opposing and blocking education reform. Case #2 demonstrates how unions often use political 
power, and power by numbers to influence policymakers and education based legislation, while 
Case #3 demonstrates how unions may use litigation to block reform efforts from occurring. 
These two cases represent the ways in which teachers’ unions have traditionally reacted to 
reforms in education through opposition due to the unions’ desire to maintain the status quo.  
The research available also shows that teacher unions are sometimes willing to contribute to 
reform efforts when the unions believe that it is possible to shape reforms in ways which would 
benefit both pupils and unionized teachers, as evidenced by the case of the Denver Classroom 
Teachers Union. In the case of the Denver Classroom Teachers Union, the union recognized that 
changes in education were bound to occur and thus sought to initiate reforms itself rather than 
allow the union to be controlled by reforms initiated by administrators and the school board. 
Union teachers became a part of the reform process and were allowed to voice their own 
opinions on the matter. Accordingly, it is likely that the union teachers in Denver also felt some 
ownership of the tenure program since they were allowed to freely experiment with the program 
and vote on whether or not to keep the tenure system in place.  
Thus, while the majority of teachers’ unions have generally sought to push against reforms in 
order to maintain the status quo, achieving reforms in education alongside the teachers’ unions is 
not impossible. Policymakers seeking to initiate education reforms might consider utilizing this 
knowledge and seek ways to create a reform process that is open to union involvement and input. 
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If policymakers are able to show union leadership how union involvement in the reform process 
can lead to policies that are better for children while still supporting union teachers, reform 
initiatives may stand a better chance at surviving and even thriving in union environments.  
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